This paper examines the ability of government bond fund managers to time the market, based on their holdings of Treasury securities during the period [1997][1998][1999][2000][2001][2002][2003][2004][2005][2006]. We find that, on average, government bond fund managers exhibit significant and positive timing ability at the one-month horizon, under a holdings-based timing measure. In particular, fund managers specializing in Treasury securities are more likely to better time the market than general government bond fund managers. We also find that more successful market timers tend to have relatively higher Morningstar ratings, larger fund flows, lower expense ratios, higher Sharpe ratios, and higher concentrations of holdings of Treasury securities. * 
Introduction
The market timing ability of equity fund managers has been extensively discussed in the literature. 1
Yet little attention has been paid so far to the same ability of bond fund managers. 2 The discrepancy is even more striking if we take into consideration the increasingly important status which bond funds enjoy in the investors' portfolios. According to the 2007 Investment Company Fact Book, the total net assets under management by non-municipal bond funds have almost tripled from $392 billion to $1.1 trillion during the 1997 to 2006 period. And at the end of 2006, these funds accounted for 11% of total mutual fund assets, as compared to 54% for equity funds. As such, it is interesting to take a close look at whether bond fund managers possess market timing skills that deliver superior risk-adjusted performance.
There has been anecdotal evidence suggesting that bond fund managers time the market or base asset allocation decisions on their views of future market conditions. For instance, in a 2006 Bloomberg article, two top government bond fund managers discuss their views about future interest rate changes and the portfolio rebalances they have done in anticipation of the fluctuations. 3 Nonetheless, the available empirical evidence on the timing ability of bond fund managers is inconclusive so far. Chen et al. (2006) , for example, adopt a return-based nine-factor model and document overall neutral timing ability among non-municipal bond fund managers during the 1962-2002 period. Based on annual sector weights, Comer (2006) finds that general government bond fund managers have neutral sector timing ability during the period of 1998 to 2004. Using a similar methodology, Moneta (2008) documents that on average taxable bond funds have neutral timing ability although there is some evidence of sector timing ability among multi-sector and high yield bond funds. Using return-based style analysis, Boney et al. (2008) even find evidence of negative timing ability by high quality corporate bond fund managers over the period 1994-2003. 1 Empirical evidence on the timing ability of equity fund managers is mixed so far. Studies that find no timing ability include Treynor and Mazuy (1966) , Chang and Lewellen (1984) , Henriksson (1984) , Graham and Harvey (1996) , Ferson and Schadt (1996) , and Becker et al. (1999) . However, Bollen and Busse (2001) document significant timing ability using daily fund returns, and Wermers (2000) , Chen et al. (2000) , and Jiang et al. (2007) find similar results using holdings-based performance analysis.
2 In fact, the literature on the performance of bond fund managers is also thin. Cornell and Green (1991) , Blake et al. (1993) , Elton et al. (1995) , and Ferson et al. (2005) , for example, document that, in general, bond funds under-perform the relevant indices, factors, or benchmarks used to measure performance.
3 Bill Gross, who oversees the world's largest bond fund at Pacific Investment Management Co., forecasts the central bank will lower interest rates in 2007 and Treasuries maturing in less than two years will lead a market rally. As a result, he increased his holdings of short-term U.S. Treasury and agency debt in September 2006 to its highest level in nine months. George Fischer, a bond fund manager at Fidelity Investments Inc., the world's largest mutual fund company, however, predicts the Federal Reserve will keep rates unchanged, possibly through 2007 and short-term U.S. government debt will lose the most. Accordingly, he avoided two-year notes in his portfolio. See "What Fidelity knows about Bernanke that Gross doesn't" by Michael McDonald, Bloomberg (10/23/2006) . These existing studies on market timing of bond funds either use the return-based timing measures or a return attribution approach based on sector weights with very limited frequency.
These measures, however, might lack sufficient power to detect the market timing ability among bond funds. For example, the return-based timing measures using monthly returns are known to have limited power in detecting the timing ability among equity funds (see, e.g., Jiang et al. (2007) ). Comer (2006) and Moneta (2008) argue that the return attribution approach is more powerful than the return-based timing measures, but the power of their tests is limited by the low frequency sector weights used.
An alternative and arguably more accurate way of measuring the market timing ability is to examine the detailed portfolio holdings of bond funds at quarterly or higher frequencies, and this is the focus of this paper. In particular, we use the holdings-based timing measures developed by Jiang et al. (2007) , who show that such measures are free from potential biases associated with interim trading and passive timing effects. In addition, these measures have higher statistical power than their return-based counterparts since the former can take advantage of return observations of individual securities at a higher frequency (e.g., daily) and over extended time periods.
For the purpose of this study, we investigate the market timing performance of government bond funds, based on their holdings of Treasury securities during the period 1997-2006. We focus on Treasury security holdings of government bond funds for two reasons. First, a manager of such funds is primarily concerned with the interest rate risk, since these funds hold mainly Treasury securities. This is different from a manager of other types of bond funds (e.g. corporate bond funds) whose returns are also subject to other market risks such as the default risk. Secondly, as the returns of individual Treasuries are highly correlated, the main mechanism by which government bond fund managers can deliver superior performance is to engage in market timing rather than asset selection activities. As a result, we focus on a sample of bond fund managers who are most likely to time the market by shifting assets across various maturities within the Treasury security sector, a sample more homogenous than those used in previous studies of bond funds. As such, it is easier to detect market timing ability in our sample if the managers do possess superior timing ability.
Our main finding, using a sample of 146 government bond funds, is that, on average, government bond fund managers possess significant and positive timing ability at the one-month forecasting horizon, based on a bootstrapping approach to statistical inference. At the three-and six-month horizons, however, government bond fund managers generally do not time the market. This result is robust to alternative ways of estimating security betas and adjusting portfolio betas, the length of data records, different time periods, and a different holdings-based timing measure. We then conduct the return-based timing tests for our sample in order to compare our results with the existing literature. The results based on actual fund returns are consistent with previous evidence of no or negative timing ability among government bond funds. The results based on hypothetical fund returns constructed from portfolio holdings, however, show that government bond funds exhibit significant and positive timing ability, indicating that portfolio holdings information is valuable in testing for the timing ability of government bond funds.
We also estimate the economic value of market timing to be 0.16% and 0.14% per year, respectively, for an average and median government bond fund, assuming continuous trading and no transaction costs. These values are economically large given that the average annual excess return of government bond funds in our sample is about 1.7%. This implies that, on average, markettiming performance explains 9.4% of annual excess returns of government bond funds. The ratio is comparable to what is documented in the literature on equity fund performance. For example, Jiang et al. (2007) find that roughly 9% of the average annual excess return of equity funds in their sample can be attributed to market timing. In addition, the economic values documented in this paper might still be achievable even after controlling for transaction costs, which are estimated to be around 1-3 basis points for Treasury securities (Fleming (2003) ). The result indicates the importance of market-timing strategies for government bond fund managers.
We further document that certain fund characteristics help identify successful market timers.
For instance, fund managers specializing in Treasury securities exhibit significant and positive timing ability compared to general government fund managers who invest in a combination of Treasury, Mortgage-backed, and agency securities. Government short-maturity bond funds are found to be the most successful market timers, followed by government intermediate-maturity and government general bond funds. In addition, market timing funds tend to be those with relatively higher Morningstar ratings, larger fund flows, lower expense ratios, higher Sharpe ratios, and higher concentrations of holdings of Treasury securities. Given that both Morningstar rating and the Sharpe ratio are measures of a fund's risk-adjusted returns, the results suggest that government bond fund managers generate higher returns by timing the market.
Finally, we find that government bond fund managers adjust their portfolio betas in response to public information, especially historical bond betas. However, average market timing performance becomes insignificant after controlling for the pre-determined macroeconomic variables, suggesting that private information appears to play little role in managers' market-timing decisions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample of government bond mutual funds used in our empirical analysis. Section 3 discusses the empirical methodology, and in particular, the holdings-based timing measures and the bootstrapping approach to statistical inference. Section 4 presents empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
Data
We use two mutual fund databases in this study. The first is the Morningstar Principia Pro Plus for Mutual Funds dataset (hereafter referred to as Morningstar), which contains stock and bond holdings for all mutual funds existing at any time between January 1997 and December 2006. 4 Morningstar also provides prospectus objectives, Morningstar ratings, duration, and the total number of holdings for each fund. The second database is the survivor-bias-free mutual fund database from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), which contains fund characteristics such as total net assets (TNA), expense ratios, and turnover rates at an annual frequency for the years 1962 to 2006, and fund holdings data of quarterly or higher frequencies from July 2003 to December 2006. We merge these two mutual fund databases by manually matching them by ticker symbols and fund names.
We exclude index funds, index enhanced funds, inflation-linked funds, mortgage-backed bond funds, and funds of funds. We restrict the sample to funds that are classified by both CRSP and Morningstar as a government bond fund. We select first those bond funds in the CRSP with S&P investment objectives of government general (GGN), government intermediate-maturity (GIM), and government short-maturity (GSM) bond funds. According to CRSP, GGN, GIM, or GSM funds invest in securities backed by the Federal Government, its agencies, or instrumentalities, with average maturities of over ten years, five to ten years, or one to five years, respectively. We next select those funds in Morningstar with a prospectus objective of general government or Treasury bond fund. (Morningstar bases a fund's prospectus objective on the wording in the prospectus sent by the mutual fund's distributor or underwriter.) According to Morningstar, general government bond funds pursue income by investing in a combination of mortgage-backed securities, Treasuries, and agency securities. In contrast, Treasury bond funds seek income by generally investing at least 80% of their assets in U.S. Treasury securities. We then include only those funds that are in both CRSP and Morningstar subsamples.
A government bond fund may hold Treasury securities, agency securities, mortgage-backed 4 Morningstar obtains the holdings data from the mutual funds on a mandatory or voluntary basis. Before 2004, by law, funds were required to disclose their holdings twice every calendar year. Effective May 2004, SEC increased the mandatory disclosure frequency from semiannual to quarterly. Many funds, however, voluntarily disclose their holdings at higher frequencies (e.g., monthly), especially from 2004.
securities, and others. For the purpose of this paper, we focus on Treasury security holdings of government bond funds in the sample. Specifically, we retain a fund's holdings of Treasury bills, notes, and bonds only. 5 We do not include a fund's holdings of TIPS and STRIPs because we do not have available their daily returns that are necessary for estimating the individual return betas of these instruments. However, the exclusion of these two types of securities should not impose systematic biases on our results as they account for less than 5% of total holdings. Data on holdings used in our analysis include those from Morningstar from January 1997 to December 2006 and those from CRSP from July 2003 to December 2006. To ensure robust statistical inference, we require a fund to have a minimum of 20 holding observations to be included in the sample. 6
The final sample includes 146 unique government bond funds along with data on their holdings of Treasury securities. Panel A of Table 1 reports summary statistics on the characteristics of these funds. As indicated in the table, 60 are GGN funds, 44 are GIM funds, and 42 are GSM funds. By Morningstar prospectus objectives, 110 are general government bond funds and 36 are Treasury bond funds. On average, a government bond fund has TNA of $413 million, a Morningstar rating of 3, duration of 4 years, an annual turnover rate of 1.64, an annual expense ratio of 0.86%, and an annual return of 5.2%. The fund characteristics are first averaged over time and then across funds.
When a fund has multiple share classes, we calculate the fund level TNA as the sum of the TNAs across different share classes. We compute the annual return, the expense ratio, and the turnover rate of the fund as the TNA-weighted averages across multiple share classes. Table 1 reports summary statistics on funds' holdings of Treasury securities. A typical government bond fund in our sample holds 176 securities, of which only eight are Treasury securities but account for about 49% of the fund's total assets. 7 The funds' holdings of Treasury securities, on average, have a Sharpe ratio of 0.58, TNA of $204 million, and duration of 5.3 years.
Panel B of
For an average fund, we have 41 observations on its holdings information. 8 5 While CRSP mutual fund database reports the detailed holdings information on Treasury bills, notes, and bonds, the holdings of Treasury bills are not available in Morningstar. Morningstar, however, reports quarterly cash holdings for each fund, which include any fixed-income securities that mature in less than 12 months. Therefore, we use the cash holdings as a proxy for the holdings of Treasury bills.
6 The holding observations might be unequally spaced as some funds might disclose their holdings at higher (than quarterly) frequencies especially in most recent years.
7 Other portfolio compositions of an average government bond fund include 3% TIPS or STRIPS, 6% agency securities, 38% mortgage-backed securities, and 3% others.
8 Portfolio holdings are sometimes available at higher (than quarterly) frequencies so that the holding observations might cluster in a short time period for some funds. To have a better understanding of the data structure, we report the number of calendar years the funds span. We find that only two funds have life spans of 2-3 years. Out of the remaining 144 funds, 13 have life spans of 3-5 years with an average of 30 holding observations, 35 have life spans of 5-8 years with an average of 36 holding observations, and 96 have life spans of 8-10 years with an average of 45 holding observations. Overall, the results indicate that about 90% of funds in our sample have holding observations spread out over five years.
When we further decompose the sample based on investment objectives, we observe several interesting patterns. First, while an average general government bond fund holds eight Treasuries which account for 42% of its total assets, Treasury bond funds, on average, invest 89% of their assets in 12 Treasuries. This suggests that Treasury funds are more concentrated on Treasury securities compared to general government funds. Similarly, we find that GSM funds are more concentrated than GIM and GGN funds. Second, consistent with their definitions, GGN funds have the longest durations, followed by GIM and GSM funds. Finally, GGN funds have higher expense ratios than GIM and GSM funds; Treasury bond funds have relatively lower expense ratios compared to general government bond funds.
We also obtain the daily returns of individual Treasury securities and one-month T-bill rates (our proxy for the risk-free rate) from CRSP. We merge the holdings data with the CRSP daily Treasury database by CUSIP. In the absence of CUSIP, we match two datasets by both coupon and maturity. Finally, we manually check the fund holdings with SEC mutual fund fillings from EDGAR and match the Treasuries with incomplete information. Over 95% of Treasury securities are matched in this process.
We use the Lehman Brother long-term government bond index return from Datastream as a proxy for the long-term government bond return.
Methodology
In this section we first review the holdings-based timing measures used in our empirical analysis to rank fund managers. We then describe the bootstrapping approach used for the statistical inference in our analysis.
Holdings-based Timing Measures
To examine the timing ability of government bond fund managers, we adopt the holdings-based timing measures developed by Jiang et al. (2007) . First, we compute the beta of individual Treasury security i on the portfolio holding date t, b i,t , using daily returns during the past one year.
Specifically, we use the following Fama and French (1993) one-factor model:
where r iτ is the excess return of Treasury security i at dayτ , T erm τ is the term premium defined as the difference between the long-term government bond return and the risk-free rate at dayτ , and k is the number of daily observations before the portfolio holding date t in the estimation. In this model, T erm proxies for the deviation of the long-term bond return from the expected return due to shifts in interest rates, and b i measures the exposure of Treasury security i to the interest rate risk (Fama and French (1993) ). To ensure a robust estimator, we require a Treasury security to have a minimum of 20 daily return observations; otherwise we set its beta to be the matching portfolio beta. 9 Notice that default risk -the other bond market factor used in Fama and French -does not enter Eq.
(1) as we focus on government bond funds, in particular their holdings of Treasury securities.
Next, we compute the portfolio beta of Treasuries held by each government bond fund at the beginning of period t + 1,β t , as follows:
where w i,t is the normalized portfolio weight of Treasury security i at the beginning of holding
is the estimated beta of Treasury security i from (1), and N t is the number of Treasury securities held by each government bond fund at the portfolio holding date t.
We then construct the two holdings-based timing measures adopted by Jiang et al. (2007) . First, we estimate the holdings-based Treynor-Mazuy timing measure, γ, from the following regression:
whereβ t is the portfolio beta at the beginning of period t + 1 from (2), and T erm t+1 is the term premium over the period t + 1. We also construct a holdings-based Henriksson-Merton timing measure as follows for robustness check:
where I {·} is an indicator function, and γ measures the timing ability of government bond fund managers. We compute the Newey-West heteroskedasticity-and autocorrelation-consistent tstatistics with a six-month lag forγ (Newey and West (1987) ). 10 If government bond fund managers 9 We construct the duration-based matching portfolios similar to the maturity-based matching portolios in Fama (1984) . Specifically, we sort Treasury securities into seven portfolios based on 12-month duration intervals: (1) from 1 to 12 months, (2) from 13 to 24 months, (3) from 25 to 36 months, (4) from 37 to 48 months, (5) from 49 to 60 months, (6) from 61 to 120 months, and (7) greater than 120 months from the quote date. The matching portfolio return is the equal-weighted average of the unadjusted holding period returns of individual Treasury securities held in the portfolio. For the cash portion in the Morningstar database, we set its beta to be the beta of the matching portfolio with the average duration of no more than one year.
10 As noted before, the holding observations might be unequally spaced for some funds. We use a slightly modified Newey-West approach to correct for potential biases associated with unequally spaced time-series data.
possess positive timing ability, we expect the γ coefficients estimated from both (3) and (4) to be significantly positive.
As shown in Jiang et al. (2007) , the holdings-based timing measures have two main advantages over the traditional return-based measures. First, the holdings-based measures do not suffer from any biases induced by the interim trading or dynamic trading effect as they use only ex-ante information on portfolio holdings. They are also robust to the passive timing effect which could be an important concern for government bond funds given the convexity of bond prices to interest rate changes. Second, the holdings-based timing tests have better statistical power than their returnbased counterparts because we can take advantage of return observations of individual Treasury securities at a daily frequency and over extended time periods. In the bootstrapping procedure, we randomly resample the time-varying term premium under the null hypothesis that no fund has timing ability, while keeping the covariance structure across fund betas unchanged. Specifically, each time we randomly sample without replacement the term premium, T erm t+1 , with the Treasury security portfolio betas,β t , unchanged for all funds and calculate the bootstrapped cross-sectional statistics of the holdings-based timing measures and their pivotal t-statistics. We repeat this procedure for a large number of times (e.g., 2,000 times in this paper) to obtain the distributions of bootstrapped statistics and then calculate the bootstrapped For example, for the Treynor-Mazuy timing measure, we multiply (3) by a dummy variable, dt , as follows: dtβt = αdt + γdtT ermt+1 + dtηt, t = 1, 2, 3, ..., T , where dt is equal to 1 if fund holdings are available at the end of month t and 0 otherwise. We then follow the standard procedure to compute the Newey-West t-statistics for γ . 
Statistical Inference: Bootstrapping

p-value as follows:
p = 1 J J j=1 I {Γ j bs >Γ} ,(5)
Empirical Analysis of Market Timing
In this section, we investigate the market timing performance of government bond fund managers using the holdings-based timing measures. We first conduct the baseline holdings-based TreynorMazuy timing tests and then several robustness tests to see whether the results are robust if we use alternative methods of estimating Treasury security betas, adjust for benchmark portfolio betas, use the active changes of portfolio betas, vary the length of data records, divide our sample into two time periods, or use a different holdings-based timing measure. We also conduct the return-based timing tests for our sample in order to compare our results with the existing literature. We then document the economic value of market timing. We further identify certain fund characteristics which could help investors choose successful market timers. Finally, we investigate whether managers use public or private information in their market timing decisions.
Holdings-based Treynor-Mazuy Timing Tests
To examine the market timing ability of government bond fund managers, we first apply the holdings-based Treynor-Mazuy timing measures as described in Section 3.1 to a sample of government bond mutual funds with a minimum of 20 holding observations during the period 1997-2006.
Statistical inference is based on a bootstrapping approach as described in Section 3.2 with 2,000 repetitions. We compute the bootstrapped p-values for the cross-sectional statistics of timing measures and their pivotal t-statistics as well. In particular, we base the statistical inference on the bootstrapped p-values for the pivotal t-statistics since the distributions of bootstrapped t-statistics are likely to have fewer problems associated with high variance or survival bias and thus have better property than the distributions of bootstrapped timing estimates. Table 2 reports the cross-sectional statistics of the holdings-based Treynor-Mazuy timing measures and their Newey-West t-statistics, together with the bootstrapped p-values, for the forecasting horizons of one, three, and six months, respectively. As discussed earlier, we focus on the bootstrapped p-values for the pivotal t-statistics for more reliable statistical inference. 11 First, at the one-month forecasting horizon, the bootstrapped p-values for the t-statistics are below 5% for the mean, median, maximum, the 75, 95, and 99th percentiles. 12 For example, the bootstrapped pvalues for the average t-statistics across 146 government bond funds is well below 1%, indicating that, on average, government bond fund managers exhibit significant and positive timing ability at the one-month horizon. Second, government bond fund managers generally do not exhibit positive timing ability at the horizons of three and six months. This suggests that it is difficult for government bond fund managers to time the market over longer horizons.
To further illustrate the results, Figure 1 
Holdings-based Treynor-Mazuy Timing Tests: Alternative Beta Estimates
In the baseline analysis, we estimate the Treasury security betas from the past one-year daily returns. To ensure that our results are not sensitive to the particular beta estimate used, we repeat 11 As shown in Table 2 , the kurtosis of the Newey-West t-statistics is much smaller than that of the timing measures, r , for all horizons, indicating that the pivotal t-statistics have more robust statistical inference than the non-pivotal timing measures. Therefore, we focus on the bootstrapped p-values for the pivotal t-statistics in the following discussions.
12 The only exception is that at the 90th percentile, the t-statistic is positive, but not statistically significant according to the bootstrapped p-value.
our holdings-based Treynor-Mazuy timing tests using two alternative estimates of Treasury security betas. First, we estimate the Treasury security betas from (1) using daily returns over the past three months. The second beta measure is estimated using monthly returns over the past five years.
For the second measure, we require an individual Treasury security to have at least 12 monthly return observations; otherwise we set its beta to be the matching portfolio beta. For both beta estimates, we further compute the value-weighted portfolio betas as in (2) and then estimate the holdings-based timing measures,γ, from (3). Table 3 reports the cross-sectional distributions of the Newey-West t-statistics for the holdingsbased timing measures with alternative estimates of Treasury security betas. The results are generally consistent with those based on the daily Treasury security returns during the past one year.
For example, at the one-month horizon, the mean, maximum, the 75, 90, 95, and 99th percentiles of t-statistics are significantly positive when the Treasury security betas are estimated from the past three-month daily returns; the mean, median, the 75, and 95th percentiles of t-statistics are significantly positive when the Treasury security betas are estimated from the past five-year monthly returns. These results suggest that evidence of positive timing ability by government bond fund managers is robust to different methods of estimating Treasury security betas.
Holdings-based Treynor-Mazuy Timing Tests: Adjusted for Benchmark Portfolio betas
To minimize potential passive timing effects and reduce cross-sectional heteroskedasiticity, we construct the adjusted beta for Treasury security i,b a i , by subtracting its duration-matched portfolio beta,b b i , from the security beta estimate,b i , i.e., 13
We then compute the portfolio beta similar to (2) using the adjusted Treasury security betas and repeat all the analysis. The results, reported in Table 4 , remain qualitatively similar after controlling for the duration-based matching portfolio betas. For example, the mean (median) of t-statistics is 0.47 (0.51) with a bootstrapped p-value of 0.00 (0.00) at the one-month forecasting horizon, indicating that government bond fund managers on average exhibit significant and positive timing ability even after we adjust the security betas for their benchmark portfolio betas.
13 The construction of duration-matched benchmark portfolio is similar to Fama (1984) .
Holdings-based Treynor-Mazuy Timing Tests: Active Changes of Fund Betas
In the baseline analysis, we construct the holdings-based timing measures as the covariance between the time-varying fund betas at the beginning of a holding period and the holding period term premium. As noted in Jiang et al. (2007) , the time variation in fund beta levels might be solely driven by the non-proportional changes in security prices but not by the active trading activities of fund managers. This is not, however, as much a concern in the Treasury market as in the stock market given that Treasury security prices are much less volatile than stock prices. Regardless, we separate the effect of active trading from the effect of passive portfolio weight changes on market timing for a robustness check.
Specifically, we construct the fund beta changes induced by active trading of government bond fund managers from month t-h to month t, Δβ t , as follows:
whereβ t is the fund portfolio beta at month t,β 
where F it−h is the face value of Treasury security i at month t-h, and P it is the price of Treasury security i at month t. For a Treasury security with the maturity date between months t-h and t, we set its price to be one and its beta to be that of the matching portfolio with average duration of no more than one year at month t.
We measure the active timing activities of fund managers over the past three months, i.e., h=3, given that on average we have quarterly portfolio holdings. 14 Table 5 reports the crosssectional distribution of Newey-West t-statistics for the holdings-based timing measures based on 14 We only keep those where the changes of portfolio holdings over the three-month period can be observed. Due to the unequal frequency, the average number of holding observations is smaller. Therefore, we require a fund to have a minimum of 10 observations of 3-moth portfolio changes to be included in the sample. The final sample includes 154 funds with an average number of 26 3-month portfolio changes. 
Sensitivity Analysis: Length of Data Records
In the baseline analysis, we require a fund to have a minimum of 20 holding observations to be included in our sample for reliable statistical inference. This requirement, however, may impose a survival bias on our results. 16 To check whether our results are sensitive to the length of data records, we vary the requirement to include government bond funds with a minimum of 10 and 30 holding observations, respectively. The sample thus includes 195 and 109 government bond funds, respectively.
The results from the bootstrap analysis indicate that the bootstrapped distributions strongly reject the null hypothesis of no significant and positive timing ability among government bond fund managers as we change the minimum requirement to 10 and 30 holding observations, respectively.
For example, at the one-month horizon, the bootstrapped p-values for the Newey-West t-statistics are well below 5% at the mean, median, maximum, the 75, and 99th percentiles for both cases, indicating strong positive timing ability among government bond fund managers. The noticeable difference is that when we impose a minimum requirement of 30 holding observations, the mean and median of t-statistics are significantly positive at the forecasting horizons of three and six months. Overall, the results suggest that evidence of positive timing ability by government bond fund managers is not driven by the potential survival bias.
Holdings-based Treynor-Mazuy Timing Tests: Sub-period Analysis
To examine whether our results are robust across different time periods, we split our data into two The power of the tests based on Δβt , however, is limited by the number of observations of portfolio betas' active changes.
16 Although the holding observations might be unequally spaced, in general, government bond funds with a smaller number of holding observations tend to be shorter-lived funds. For example, within the ten-year period from 1997 to 2006, funds with 10 to 20, 20 to 30, and more than 30 holding observations have average life spans of 4.2, 7, and 8.4 years, respectively. Therefore, when we exclude funds with less than 20 holding observations, we most likely exclude those with shorter life spans.
average of 16 holding observations in the first period, and 145 funds with an average of 27 holding observations in the second period.
The results show that the evidence of positive timing ability is stronger in the second period. For example, the mean, median, and the upper percentiles of t-statistics are significantly higher than the bootstrapped ones during the 2002-2006 period; during the 1997-2001 period, the mean of tstatistics is significantly positive based on the bootstrapped p-value while the median of t-statistics is slightly negative but insignificant. However, we note that the holding reporting frequency is much lower in the first period than in the second period. Therefore, the statistical power of the test in the 1997-2001 period might be limited by the data frequency in this period.
A related issue is whether the documented timing ability is persistent among government bond fund managers. Due to the limited frequency of portfolio holdings, it is not feasible to conduct a rigorous test of persistence in our sample. To get some rough ideas, however, we examine whether those funds in the top and bottom deciles in the first time period continue to do so in the second period. We find that out of 15 funds in the top decile in the first period, only two (Vanguard Shortterm Treasury Fund and STI Classic US Short-term Treasury Security Fund) continue to stay in the top decile while three either move to the bottom decile or disappear in the second period. For those funds in the bottom decile in the first period, six of them disappear in the second period.
While the evidence is inconclusive, the results suggest that the positive timing ability seems to be short-lived.
Holdings-based Henriksson-Merton Timing Tests
We also perform the holdings-based Henriksson-Merton timing tests in (4) for the forecasting horizons of one, three, and six months. The individual Treasury security betas are estimated using the past one-year daily returns. We also require government bond funds to have a minimum of 20 holding observations to be included in our sample.
The results suggest that the holdings-based tests, based on the Henriksson-Merton timing measures, produce qualitatively similar patterns as the Treynor-Mazuy timing tests. For example, at the one-month horizon, the mean, maximum, the 75, 95, and 99th percentiles of t-statistics are significantly positive, indicating evidence of overall positive timing ability by government bond fund managers. At the three-and six-month horizons, the mean and median t-statistics are insignificant, indicating that, on average, government bond fund managers do not time the market, although there is some evidence of significant timing at higher extreme percentiles for the six-month horizon. Overall, we document robust evidence of positive timing ability by government bond fund managers at the one-month horizon using the Henriksson-Merton timing measures.
Return-based Timing Tests
Previous studies document that bond fund managers in general have no or negative market timing ability based on the return-based timing measures (Chen et al. (2006) and Boney et al. (2008) ). To compare our results with the existing literature, we perform the return-based timing tests similar to Treynor and Mazuy (1966) for our sample of government bond funds as follows:
where r it is the excess return of government bond fund i in month t, T erm t is the term premium in month t, and γ i is the return-based timing measure of individual government bond fund i. 17
Following Jiang et al. (2007), we base the statistical inference of the return-based timing tests on a parametric bootstrapping approach. Specially, we retain the parameter estimatesâ i andb i , as well as the residualsê it from the following OLS model for individual fund i :
We then resample the term premium T erm * t and construct the bootstrapped fund returns, r * it , as follows:
With r * it and T erm * t we calculate the bootstrapped cross-sectional statistics of the return-based timing measures and their Newey-West t-statistics with a lag of 6. We repeat this procedure for 2,000 times to obtain the distributions of bootstrapped statistics and then calculate the bootstrapped p-value as in (5).
Panel A of Table 6 reports the cross-sectional distributions of the Newey-West t-statistics (t) and their bootstrapped p-values for the return-based timing measures. The results show that under the return-based timing measures, those government bond funds in our sample on average do not exhibit significant and positive timing abilities. For example, the mean (median) of t-statistics is 0.37 (0.37) with a bootstrapped p-value of 0.99 (0.98). These results are in general consistent with the previous evidence of no or negative timing ability among bond fund managers based on the return-based timing tests. 17 We note that the term premium (proxy for interest rate risk) might not completely explain the returns of government bond funds as these funds hold only 49% of their assets in Treasury securities. However, the average adjusted R 2 is 76%, indicating that interest rate risk is the most important risk factor.
We also construct the hypothetical monthly returns of government bond funds based on their holdings of Treasury securities. In particular, we assume that the funds hold the same portfolios until the next portfolio report date. For those Treasury securities with the maturity date between the two portfolio report dates, we assume that the amount received on the maturity date will be reinvested at the market risk-free rate until the next portfolio report date.
We then repeat the above procedure to conduct the return-based timing tests using the hypothetical Treasury security portfolio returns. The results, reported in Panel B of Table 6 , show that government bond funds exhibit significant and positive timing ability. This suggests that although the frequency is limited, the portfolio holdings provide valuable information to test for the timing ability among government bond funds.
Economic Value of Market Timing
Having documented the statistical significance of market timing performance of government bond fund managers, we subsequently examine the potential economic value of market timing. Following Henriksson and Merton (1981) , Merton (1981) , Glosten and Jagannathan (1994) , and Jiang et al.
(2007), we quantify the economic value of market timing ability of government bond fund managers as a contingent claim on the bond market index return. Specifically, suppose government bond funds follow the following return generating process:
where r t is the excess bond fund return over the holding period t, T erm t is the term premium,
i.e., the long-term government bond return (a proxy for the bond market index return) in excess of the risk-free rate, r f , γ = 0 indicates no timing ability, and γ > 0 indicates positive timing ability. If government bond fund managers time a common risk factor in the bond market, i.e., the interest rate risk, market timing would generate a payoff of γT erm 2 t with the maturity equal to the forecasting horizon. Suppose the long-term government bond returns are log-normally distributed with a historical mean, μ bm , and standard deviation, σ bm , the value of market timing, V, is then the expected present value of γT erm 2 t under the risk neutral measure (Q ):
To compute the economic value of market timing, we assume an annual risk-free rate of 3.5%
and monthly bond market return variance of 0.06%. 18 Based on the mean and median holdings- Another issue is whether market timing adds value for government bond fund investors. As discussed in Aragon and Ferson (2006) , the above numbers, even after adjusted for transaction costs, do not necessarily represent the value added for investors because they do not take into account the expenses associated with active management. Given that the average expense ratio is 86 bps for all government bond funds (Table 1) , the result indicates that on average the expenses charged by government bond funds are too large to be justifiable by the value generated from market timing alone.
Fund Characteristics and Market Timing
While we document positive timing ability for the average government bond fund, we also observe a wide variation of timing performance across funds. Therefore, an interesting question remains whether there is any commonality among successful market timers. In particular, we examine whether government bond funds with certain investment objectives are more likely to better time the market. We also identify the links between a few other fund characteristics and market timing to see whether these characteristics may help investors choose successful market timers.
To examine whether investment objectives are associated with market timing, we perform the holdings-based timing tests for fund subgroups with different investment objectives, based on two classification methods. First, we divide the sample into three different subgroups by the CRSP S&P investment objectives, namely government general (GGN), government intermediate-maturity
(GIM), and government short-maturity (GSM) bond funds. We also decompose the sample into general government and Treasury bond funds based on the Morningstar prospectus objectives.
Panel A of Table 7 reports the cross-sectional distributions of Newey-West t-statistics and their bootstrapped p-values at the one-month horizon for subgroups with different CRSP S&P investment objectives. The results suggest that GSM and GIM funds are generally more likely to time the market than GGN funds. For example, the mean, median, and the upper percentiles of t-statistics are significantly higher than the bootstrapped ones for GSM and GIM funds. GGN funds, however, on average, do not exhibit significant and positive timing ability with a bootstrapped p-value of 0.12 for the mean statistics, although there is some evidence of positive timing for the median fund and the fund at the 75% percentile. Ranked by the mean and median t-statistics, GSM funds are the most successful market timers, followed by GIM and GGN funds. A potential explanation for this finding is that government bond funds focusing on Treasury securities with relatively shorter durations are more flexible in adjusting fund betas, and therefore, more successful in timing the market. In addition, by their investment objectives GSM funds on average can choose from a pool of 128 Treasury securities, as compared to only 51 and 42 for GIM and GGN funds, respectively.
Therefore, GSM funds have more flexibility in timing the market.
Panel B of Table 7 shows the bootstrap results at the one-month horizon for general government and Treasury bond funds, respectively. As discussed earlier, while general government funds pursue income by investing in a combination of mortgage-backed securities, Treasuries, and agency securities, Treasury funds seek income by generally investing at least 80% of their assets in U.S.
Treasury securities. Moreover, Treasury funds tend to be more concentrated than general government funds. Therefore, we intuitively expect Treasury bond fund managers more likely to be successful market timers in the Treasury sector as they specialize in Treasury securities. Consistent with our intuition, Treasury fund managers exhibit superior positive timing ability compared to general government fund managers. For example, the bootstrapped p-values for the t-statistics at the mean, median, maximum, the 75, 90, 95, and 99th percentiles are all below 1% for Treasury funds, indicating strong evidence of significant and positive market timing ability by these fund managers. In addition, these timing activities generate significant economic value of 1.37%
(1.49%) per year before transaction costs for an average (median) Treasury fund. Note that the average expense ratio of Treasury bond funds in our sample is only 70 bps ( We first examine the characteristics of market timers in Risk-adjusted return is calculated by subtracting a risk penalty from each fund's total return, after accounting for all loads, sales charges, and redemption fees. The risk penalty is determined by the amount of variation in the fund's monthly returns, with emphasis on downward variation. The greater the variation is the larger the penalty resulting.
20 Funds are assigned one to five stars if they are ranked as bottom 10%, next 22.5%, middle 35%, next 22.5%, and top 10% within their categories, respectively.
suggesting that more successful market timers attract more fund flows from the investors. Finally, most successful market timing funds have lower expense ratios, larger total net assets, and higher concentrations of holdings of Treasury securities than those with the most perverse timing ability.
We next examine whether these characteristics help identify successful market timers. To explore this issue, we take the time-series averages of fund characteristics and rank the funds into five quintiles by each characteristic. 21 We then examine the timing ability of government bond fund managers within each quintile. Panels A, B, C, and D of Table 9 report bootstrapped p-values for the t-statistics of the holdings-based Treynor-Mazuy timing measures at the one-month horizon within each quintile ranked by Morningstar rating, fund flow, expense ratio, and turnover rate, respectively. Interestingly, from Panel A, we find that the t-statistics are significantly positive at the mean, median, and all the upper percentiles for the government bond funds with the highest Morningstar ratings. In contrast, the t-statistics are insignificant and even negative at the mean and median for funds with the lowest Morningstar ratings. As Morningstar rating is a measure of a fund's risk-adjusted return, the result suggests that funds with better performance are more likely to be successful market timers. Panel B shows that funds that attract more flows from the investors are more likely to successfully time the market. Based on the expense ratio, Panel C indicates that more successful market timing bond funds tend to charge lower fees from investors according to the mean and median of t-statistics. Panel D reports the results based on the turnover rate. However, the link between the turnover rate and market timing is not clear. For example, government bond funds with significant and positive market timing ability do not have the highest or lowest turnover rates. Instead, they tend to be the funds with turnover rates in the middle, indicating that successful market timers tend to trade more frequently, but they are not among those who trade the most frequently.
The bootstrap results at the one-month horizon for the quintile groups formed on the Sharpe ratio, TNA, duration, and %Holding are reported in Panels E, F, G, and H of Table 9, To remove potential trend in the fund characteristics, we also obtain the percentile rank of each characteristic across funds every year, which is averaged over time for each fund and then ranked into five quintiles across funds. The results, not reported here for brevity, remain qualitatively similar. Overall, we find that certain fund characteristics help identify successful market timing government bond funds. In particular, more successful market timers tend to have relatively higher Morningstar ratings, larger fund flows, lower expense ratios, higher Sharpe ratios, and higher concentrations of holdings of Treasury securities. These findings provide some useful guidelines for investors when they make investment decisions.
Market Timing and Public Information
Several studies suggest that the price movements in the Treasury market are mainly driven by public information (see among others, Fleming and Remolona (1999) and Balduzzi et al. (2001) ).
Existing literature has identified a small set of macroeconomic variables which can predict longterm government bond returns (see e.g., Keim and Stambaugh (1986) and Ilmanen (1995) ). Given that the horizon of bond return predictability is similar to the horizon at which government bond fund managers are found to time the market in this paper, it is natural to ask whether managers rely on those macroeconomic variables in their market timing. In addition to public information, private information (or price discovery through order flow imbalances) might play a role in the U.S.
Treasury market (Brandt and Kavajecz (2005) ). Therefore, we further examine whether government bond fund managers use any private information in their market timing decisions.
To address the first question, we conduct the following regression for each fund i:
whereβ it is the Treasury security portfolio beta at month t and M t−1 is the vector of one-month lagged macroeconomic variables. In this paper, we use four economic variables as in Ilmanen (1995) , namely, term spread (TERMSP ), real bond yield (REALYLD ), inverse relative wealth (INVRELW ), and bond beta (BETA). TERMSP is the difference between 10-year and 3-month Treasury yields. REALYLD is the difference between 10-year bond yield and the one-month lagged year-on-year inflation rate. The first two instruments proxy for the overall expected bond risk premium. INVRELW is the ratio of past to current real wealth which is defined as follows:
where W t is the real level of stock market (the value-weighted CRSP market index deflated by the consumer price index) at time t, and the numerator is the exponentially weighted average of real stock market levels up to t-1. INVRELW is a proxy for the time-varying risk aversion. Finally, we use the historical bond beta, which is the slope coefficient from a regression of excess long-term government bond returns on excess stock market returns, as a proxy for the time-varying risk.
We base the statistical inference on a parametric bootstrapping approach as in Jiang et al. Therefore, the bond beta in some way reflects the impact of macroeconomic information on the bond market.
To further examine whether government bond fund managers use private information in their market timing, we conduct the following tests for each fund i : Table 10 suggests that private information plays little role in government bond fund managers' asset allocation decisions. In fact, the average timing measure even becomes slightly negative but insignificant after controlling for the four macroeconomic variables. This result is different from Jiang et al. (2007) who document that equity fund managers use information about stock market returns not captured by those pre-determined macroeconomic variables. This is not surprising, however, given that both public and private information play an important role in the stock market while public information plays a major role in the Treasury market (Andersen et al. (2007) ).
To summarize, we find that government bond fund managers adjust their portfolio betas in response to public information, especially the time-varying risk of bond market. In addition, private information appears to play little role in fund managers' asset allocation decisions.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the market timing ability of a sample of government bond fund managers, based on their holdings of Treasury securities during the period 1997 to 2006. By focusing on government bond funds, in particular their Treasury security holdings, we limit our sample to those funds for which it is easier to document the market timing ability if the managers do time the market, i.e., if they make asset allocation decisions based on their correct views of future market conditions.
Using the holdings-based timing measures developed by Jiang et al. (2007) , we provide robust evidence that, on average, government bond fund managers possess significant and positive market timing ability at the one-month horizon, based on a bootstrapping approach to statistical inference. We then conduct return-based timing tests for those funds in our sample in order to compare our results with existing literature. We also document the economic value of market timing, which indicates that market timing is an important investment strategy by government bond fund managers.
We further identify certain fund characteristics which may help investors choose successful market timers. We find that, in general, fund managers specializing in Treasury securities exhibit significant and positive timing ability compared to general government fund managers who invest in a combination of Treasury securities, Mortgage-backed securities, and agency securities. In addition, government short-maturity fund managers are the most successful market timers, followed by government intermediate-maturity and government general fund managers. Finally, more successful market timers tend to have relatively higher Morningstar ratings and Sharpe ratios, larger fund flows, lower expense ratios, and higher concentrations of holdings of Treasury securities. Given that the Morningstar rating and the Sharpe ratio are measures of a fund's risk-adjusted returns, the results provide supporting evidence that government bond fund managers enhance their performance by timing the market.
Finally, we find that government bond fund managers solely rely on public information, especially historical bond betas, when adjusting their portfolio betas. Private information appears to play little role in their market-timing decisions.
In conclusion, by using a more homogeneous sample, a better timing measure, and more robust statistical inference, we shed more light on the market timing ability of government bond fund managers in this analysis. Our findings also have implications for the performance evaluation of active bond fund managers and the investment decision-making of investors as well. This table reports measures with alternative estimates of Treasury security betas for government bond funds with a minimum of 20 holding observations during the 1997 to 2006 period. Treasury security betas are estimated from the past three-month daily returns (3m) and the past five-year monthly returns (5y), respectively. Panels A, B, and C report the results for the forecasting horizons of one, three, and six months, respectively. The bootstrapped p-values for the Newey-West t-statistics (p) are shown in the parentheses underneath. "Stdev," "Skew,"
and "Kurto" denote the cross-sectional standard deviation, skewness, and excess kurtosis, respectively. 
